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Fifty Years of  
Contemporary Relevance, Theoretical Revisions and Conceptual Reflection 
 
 
 
Over half a century has passed since the publication of A. H. BirchÕs Representative and Responsible 
Government (1964), yet it still continues as a seminal source for leading contemporary political 
scientists (see for example Rhodes 2011:280-1). Along the way it has been identified as one of the 
classic analyses of UK constitutional politics (Flinders 2010:73) and more broadly as one of the 
Ôbest analytical surveys of representationÕ (Wahlke 1971) as well as offering exceptional insights 
into notions of responsibility (Mair 2009:11). BirchÕs (1964:21) initial linkage of representation 
and responsibility - Ôa representative system enables a government to be responsibleÕ in a number 
of different ways - has come under sustained and critical reflection by subsequent scholars of 
both government and governance. This critical political analysis complements BirchÕs own 
recognition of the complexities and ambiguities in his conceptualisation of both representation 
and responsibility (plus the practical vagaries, tensions and contradictions inherent in their 
systemic interconnectedness as Ôrepresentative and responsible governmentÕ). In the intervening 
five decades these complexities and ambiguities have multiplied and this is reflected through 
increased conceptual sophistication, in a ÔrethinkingÕ of notions of representation and 
responsibility, and through increased complexity and indeterminacy of government itself, to the 
extent that the term ÔgovernanceÕ, with all of its associated adjectives Ð decentred, multi-level, 
global, meta Ð is now seen as a more accurate descriptor of governing practice. In turn, these 
ideational and empirical challenges have resulted in claims that representative and responsible 
government has now been displaced by representative versus responsible government (Mair 2009, 
2011); or, more dramatically still, that there has been an Ôend to representative politicsÕ (Tormey 
2015) and, simultaneously, the displacement of Ôstandard modelÕ linear forms of responsibility in 
more complex models reflecting the expansion of lateral or horizontal modes of accountability, 
captured most vividly in KeaneÕs (2009, 2011) notion of Ômonitory democracyÕ. From this 
perspective electoral processes and institutions in themselves provide for neither representative nor 
responsible government. 
 
The aim of this article is therefore to use BirchÕs Representative and Responsible as the central 
intellectual reference point from which to analyse: (1) The contemporary relevance and meaning 
of the concepts of representativeness and responsibility; (2) The state of the discipline today in 
terms of understanding the relationship between these concepts; and (3) the distance the discipline 
of political studies has actually travelled from BirchÕs initial landmark study. Our core argument is 
that although the discipline has travelled a great distance in terms of empirical breadth and analytical 
complexity the roots of much of this scholarship owe a great deal (implicitly or explicitly) to BirchÕs 
scholarship, and specifically due to his focus on the nexus between notions of representativeness 
and responsibilities. The focus on this nexus (and the inevitable governing tensions that come 
with it) and the practical achievement of specific normative concepts is arguably more important 
today as a focus of scholarly inquiry (in the United Kingdom and far beyond) than when BirchÕs 
work was first published. Moreover, the death of the author in December 2014 makes this a 
fitting point to both recognise and further interrogate that set of ideas and themes that A. H. 
Birch crafted fifty years ago.  
 
In order to make this argument this article is divided into five interconnected sections that offer 
the findings of a large synthetic research project (i.e. an approach that focuses on integrating, 
connecting and reflecting upon existing research contributions) that has been based at 
Strathclyde University and the University of Sheffied. The first section offers a very brief account 
of BirchÕs thesis regarding representative and responsible government as the foundation for 
subsequent debates. The second section looks Ôbeyond BirchÕ through the analysis of a seam of 
scholarship, largely derived from the field of party politics, that suggested a quite different 
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conceptual relationship in the sense of representative versus responsible government. This flows 
into the third sectionÕs focus on the broadening out of conceptualisations of both representation 
and responsibility in a number of islands of theorising that broadly emerged out of the 
Ôgovernance turnÕ in political studies and political science. This includes a focus on network 
governance, fuzzy accountability, meta-governance and global governance as indicative topics of 
analysis that can be traced back to BirchÕs Representative and Responsible. And yet what is arguably as 
interesting but less recognised is the manner in which BirchÕs focus on Ôthe nexusÕ flows out 
across a broader range of debates and sub-fields, and notable those concerned with Ôthe endÕ or 
ÔfutureÕ of representative politics. It is for this reason that the fourth part of this article draws 
upon the work of scholars such as John Keane and Simon Tormey and their quite different 
interpretations of the representative-responsible linkage(s). The final fifth section focuses on the 
Ôso what?Õ question in the sense of reflecting  
 
 
I. REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSIBLE 
 
 
 
What is the core thesis or intellectual seed that was sown in BirchÕs Representative and Responsible 
half a century ago? At one level the answer is quite simple, the argument is that a government 
must somehow balance being representative (i.e. being open, inclusive, accountable, etc.) while 
also being responsible (i.e. controlled, stable, ÔstrongÕ, etc.). Ô[E]veryone knows that the British 
constitution provides a system of representative and responsible government. These 
characteristics are almost universally regarded as both desirable and importantÕ, Birch states 
(1964:13). At a deeper level, however, his thesis questions the innate incompatibility, or at the 
very least the potential tension or grating that the parallel quest for these concepts may generate. 
In this sense his analysis reached far beyond the terrain of British politics and instead sought to 
expose a set of governing paradoxes that were to some extent inevitable within democratic 
governance and could not be dismissed in simplistic terms. (From this perspective BirchÕs 
Representative and Responsible has echoes of Bernard CrickÕs In Defence of Politics that was published 
just two years before.) 
 
By offering this focus on the nexus between representation and responsible Birch was making a 
very strong and direct critique of the traditional descriptive and institutionally focused studies of 
British government. For Birch, these tended to adopt over-simplistic principal-agent assumptions 
whereby Ôpolitical power flowed exclusively in one direction from electors to parliament and 
from parliament to governmentÕ (1964:74) without acknowledging reverse flows, pushback or 
spillovers (see 1964:74, 138, 164). Ô[C]onventional ways of portraying the political systemÕ Birch 
argued (1964:239) implied that Ôpolitical power can be clearly and precisely locatedÕ and therefore 
provide Ôa misleading picture of the distribution of political power and influenceÕ (1964:240). 
Governing was, for Birch, far more complex and multi-dimensional than existing analyses had 
sufficiently captured or exposed. A focus on the relationship representation and responsibility 
therefore provided a simple intellectual tool through which to start articulating, exploring and 
exposing some of these complexities. Put slightly differently, Birch (like Crick) was concerned 
with the relationship between Ôpolitics as theoryÕ and Ôpolitics as practiceÕ and this allowed him to 
expand his analysis beyond the internal realms of governing and into broader questions of 
democratic legitimacy. He wrote, for example, that although Ô[i]n western democracies 
representation by election has come to be regarded as the most important form of representation, 
and indeed the only proper basis of a political systemÉ it would not be right either in principle 
or practice simply to equate representation with electionÕ (1964:17) and thereby presaged the 
debate concerning the nature and meaning of legitimacy which has grown in prominence in 
recent years (e.g. Wood 2016). 
 
But in many ways BirchÕs classic text was a work of conceptual political analysis in which he 
dissected the concepts of both representativeness and responsibility to reveal their inherent 
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ambiguities and uses. ÔResponsible governmentÕ, for example, was a term that could suggest a 
focus on ÔresponsivenessÕ (i.e. where political and bureaucratic executives were expected to be 
responsive to public demands) or to invoke notions of Ôduty and moral responsibilityÕ to behave 
in a certain manner or against a certain set of principles (1964:18). It might even be used in a 
third sense to convey some sense of ÔaccountabilityÕ in terms of answerability by providing 
information, a capacity for amending behaviours and practices, and ultimately accepting 
culpability (both collectively and individually). The simple act of dissecting the possible 
interpretations of Ôresponsible governmentÕ was therefore critical for BirchÕs thesis due to the 
manner in which it challenges over-simplistic assumptions, revealed the existence of certain 
potential conceptual incompatibilities and related to the historical shift in power between the 
executive and legislature (i.e. the parliamentary decline thesis) which had affected the capacity of 
actors to externally enforce specific assumptions about behaviour. The relevance and utility of 
BirchÕs arguments are seen in the manner in which subsequent authors, such as ???? Tant (1990), 
David Judge (1993), ???? Beattie (1995), and David Marquand (????) have drawn upon his work to 
expose what have variously been termed ÔWhigÕ, ÔWestminsterÕ or ÔrepresentativeÕ strands within 
the British political tradition and their relationship with ÔPeeliteÕ, ÔWhitehallÕ or ÔresponsibleÕ 
components. And yet at its core Birch offered an analytical frame that focused on the nexus or 
complementarity between responsibility and representation. The next section reveals how this 
initial focus was challenged and developed in subsequent analyses that adopted a more agonistic 
approach couched around the notion of responsibility versus representation. 
 
 
II. REPRESENTATIVE  RESPONSIBLE  
 
 
The aim of this section is to look Ôbeyond BirchÕ in the sense of how the arguments set out in 
Representative and Responsible influenced subsequent studies and analyses in a process that is 
analogous to a form of intellectual path dependency. For Birch (see 1964:17-22) the link or nexus 
between representative government, on the one hand, and responsible government, on the other, 
flowed from the manner in which representative process allowed for the aggregation and 
articulation of public preferences through political parties, and for those preferences, through the 
electoral process, to be reflected in the policies of government (i.e. for there to be 
responsiveness). Moreover, where a gap existed between popular preferences and government 
policies the processes and mechanisms of responsibility required political parties to account for 
such incongruence. This was therefore an unashamedly conservative lens that correlated with 
BirchÕs view (see 1964:245) that not only did the UK enjoy a Ôsystem of disciplined party 
governmentÕ but that is was also this system that ensured a proportionate balance of 
representation and responsibility was secured. It was therefore for parties to occupy, navigate and 
manage the mediating political space surrounding the representative/responsible nexus. 
 
In recent decades a number of studies of representative government in western liberal 
democracies (e.g. Katz 1987, 2014; Jones and McDermott 2004; Dalton et al. 2011; Hill et al. 
2015; Bardi et al. 2014; van Biezen 2014) have questioned the capacity of parties to fulfil this role 
in ways that contest BirchÕs initial position. Nadia UrbinatiÕs Representative Democracy (2006), for 
example, highlights the dilemma faced by political parties in fulfilling this role due to their status 
as Ôpartial-yet-communal associationsÕ in which they must translate a myriad of partial and often 
incompatible preferences and demands into a set of homogenous policies that are framed as 
being in Ôthe public interestÕ. This, once again, resonate with CrickÕs focus on the role of political 
institutions, in general, and political parties, in particular, as mechanisms of conflict resolution Ð 
Ôthe tough squeezing of collective decisions out of multiple and competing interests and opinionsÕ 
(Stoker, 2006). As David Farrell emphasises (2014), political parties occupy a position in which 
the distinction between representative parties and governing parties veils the existence of a potentially 
far-reaching tensions or trade-offs. To some extent therefore, and linking back to BirchÕs 
Representative and Responsible as a key articulation point, the tension between responsiveness and 
responsibility has been a constant theme in the field of party politics, but without necessarily 
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being posited as a contradictory or incompatible relationship (for a discussion see Bardi et al. 
2014:238, 241).  
 
A significant shift in approach (i.e. from Ôrepresentative and responsible governmentÕ to 
assumptions concerning Ôresponsiveness versus responsibilityÕ) emerged largely from the analyses 
of modern party dynamics and representative processes by Peter Mair (2009; 2011). These would, 
in time, be crystallised into MairÕs Managing the Void (2014) and would offer a powerful argument 
concerning the supposedly benign linkage of ÔresponsivenessÕ and ÔresponsibilityÕ and instead 
posit Ôa growing gap between representation and governmentÕ [emphasis added]. Moreover, not 
only had the twin representative and responsible components of party politics become disentangled 
but the position had been reached where parties had now moved Ôtheir centre of gravities from 
civil society to the stateÕ with a concomitant shift from Ôcombining representative and 
governmental roles (or combining representative and procedural or institutional roles) to building 
on their governmental role aloneÕ (Mair 2011:8 original emphasis). With this perceived separation 
of roles came a new division of labour Ôwhereby the mainstream parties would govern, or 
primarily govern, while other agencies [including organised groups, social movements, self-
authorised representatives, the media, and ÔnicheÕ or ÔchallengerÕ parties] would look after the 
citizensÕ representative needsÕ (Mair 2011:8). Simple serial principal-agent conceptions of 
representation were therefore rejected in a manner that connects with BirchÕs similar position; 
whereas MairÕs focus on the emergence of complex organisational networks within civil society 
above and beyond ÔtraditionalÕ political parties dovetails with the arguments of Keane regarding 
monitory democracy (discussed below). The core insight for the purposes of this article, however, 
was MairÕs contention regarding the emergence of legitimation problems Ôunless parties can 
represent as well as governÕ (Katz and Mair 2009:760). The conceptual presumption being that 
governing and representing can be disentangled in both theory and practice. 
 
If Birch offers a lens based around parallel processes of Ôrepresentation and responsibilityÕ and 
Mair offers a bifurcated prism of Ôrepresentation versus responsibilityÕ then the work of Enroth 
(2015) offers a forceful critique of the latter and shifts the focus of attention back towards the 
former. EnrothÕs basic argument is that MairÕs analysis of the Ôcartel partyÕ and contemporary 
party-state relationships too easily assumes that the representative functions of parties have been 
eroded or, as Enroth puts it, Ô[e]nter the cartel party, exit party representationÕ (2015:4). The 
focus of mainstream parties may well have shifted in recent years, Enroth concedes, through the 
emergence of Ôvalence politicsÕ and a focus on demonstrating governing competence but it 
remains too simplistic to suggest that the representative link between voters and parties has been 
severed. Parties, as Michael Saward (2010) has shown in detail, still have to make claims to 
represent the interests and opinions of their collective constituencies, and these claims have to be 
accepted by those constituencies. In this manner it is not a case that different typologies of 
parties (cadre, mass, catch-all, or cartel) can be used to differentiate some types of party that 
represent and some that do not, instead it is more accurate to distinguish between different party 
types according to different claims to represent. In the end, therefore, the changes and 
developments in party government mapped by Mair and others has not according to a separate 
strand of scholarship resulted in Ôrepresentative versus responsible governmentÕ but rather point to 
more complex and expansive interactions between processes of representation and responsibility 
in 21st liberal democratic states.  
 
But what this section has shown is the ongoing and contemporary relevance of the 
representative/responsible nexus that was first brought to the fore by Birch in his 1964 book. It 
has presented this argument through recourse to the field of party politics and it would be 
possible to drill down further into this seam of scholarship in order to further demonstrate the 
shadow of BirchÕs scholarship. The emergence and role of ÔinsurgentÕ and often populist parties 
across Western Europe, for example, can (and has) been set explicitly within the 
representative/responsible debate with the danger interpreted as being that party systems may 
become increasingly bifurcated Ôwith the established parties acting responsibly, but not very 
responsively, and the populist parties and other outside challengers acting responsively, but not 
very responsiblyÕ (van Biezen 2014:189). The representative/responsible nexus has also been 
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challenged by the shift towards the politics of depoliticisation (see Flinders and Buller 2006:298; 
Pettit 2004:58; Flinders and Wood, 2015) whereby elected politicians and political parties support 
the widespread delegation of powers, responsibilities and governing competencies away from the 
direct control of representative actors or processes in an attempt to demonstrate governing 
competence, reduce democratic pressures, overcome well-known credible commitment dilemmas, 
etc.. The result being interpretations of the Ôhollowing out of democracyÕ that locate debates 
concerning the representative/responsible nexus into broader concerns regarding the emergence 
of fuzzy governance and fuzzy accountability and force anyone tracing the broader contemporary 
relevance of BirchÕs Representative and Responsible to move from the field of party politics to the 
sphere of governance and public policy.  
 
 
III. GOVERNANCE, REPRESENTATION & RESPONSIBILITY 
The central argument of this article is that BirchÕs Representative and Responsible remains a valuable 
text for scholars with an interest in contemporary democratic governance due to the manner in 
which it focuses attention on the tension between notions of representativeness and 
responsibility that must somehow be navigated by political actors and institutions. Fifty years 
have passed since the first publication of BirchÕs most renowned book and the changes in 
relation to social, economic, political, cultural and technological processes have been far-reaching 
and are captured in Zygmunt BaumanÕs concept of Ôliquid modernityÕ in which traditional social 
anchorage points have, to a great extent, been eroded. The aim of this section is to locate BirchÕs 
Representative and Responsible at the confluence of a set of debates concerning the transition from 
government to governance and the impact of this transition for notions of both representation 
and responsibility in order to assess the distance the discipline of political studies has actually 
travelled since BirchÕs initial landmark study and why his analysis remains germane. In this regard 
it is essential to recognise that in many ways BirchÕs work prefigured the rise of governance as 
arguably the Ôuber conceptÕ of the final decades of the twentieth century. His critique of the 
artificialities of Ôaccepted waysÕ of describing British government and the Ômisleading picture of 
the distribution of political power and influenceÕ (1964, 240) focused on the rejection of simple 
principal-agent models or zero-sum assumptions about the position of power (see 
(1964:113,131,138,140,207,211). Governing, for Birch, was not the preserve simple of ministers 
and their officials but also encompassed a broad range of non-elected and non-governmental 
organisations that often challenged dominant assumptions regarding centralised and hierarchical 
structures. In this respect, and with the benefit of hindsight, Birch was actually an early pioneer 
of the analysis of governance before the development and analytical implications of the concept 
had actually been conceived. This can be illustrated by setting BirchÕs focus on the 
representative/responsible nexus within the context of four specific sub-fields of governance-
theoretic research - network governance, meta-governance and global governance. 
 
 
 i. Network Governance [1,000 words] 
 
Although the term ÔgovernanceÕ can be traced back several centuries it is sufficient for the 
purposes of this article to locate Ôthe governance turnÕ of the late twentieth century squarely 
against the publication of Rod Rhodes Understanding Governance (1997) with its emphasis on the 
transition from traditional hierarchies to complex networks and markets and how this 
complicated traditional conceptions of governing. This Ôshift from a hierarchic state to 
governance in and by networksÕ - to paraphrase Mark Bevir (2010:81) Ð posed distinctive 
questions for notions of representation and representativeness that resonated with the earlier 
arguments of Birch. The emergence of what Matthew Flinders (2008:3) describes as a Ôdense 
sphere of independent agencies, non-majoritarian institutions, ÒparastatalÓ or ÒsatelliteÓ bodies, 
extra-governmental organizations, hybrids [fringe bodies, quangos]Õ in which governmental 
bodies are but one (admittedly core) actor within an increasingly fluid network directly challenged 
conventional notions of what constituted representative and responsible government (see 
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Hendricks 2009:709). More specifically, the perceived Ôhollowing out of the stateÕ appeared to 
emphasise a certain market-based understanding of responsible government that prized efficiency, 
delivery and outputs above the more representative and process-based considerations associated 
with scrutiny, openness, etc. To some extent this development was not surprising given that 
much of post-war British political studies had been dedicated to charting the decline of 
parliament and the dominance of the executive, the analysis of governance arguably charted little 
more than the latest stage in this process and the gradual evisceration of the direct capacity of 
elected politicians and their officials. But when located against BirchÕs thesis the transition was 
arguably far deeper than this historical account suggests. As Saward (2005:180) emphasises, ÔWe 
are not dealing here with a simple transfer of ÒrepresentativeÓ politics from one type of domain 
to another, but rather a significant shift in the primary political sense of representation as a 
practice and conceptÕ. 
 
The question then focuses on understanding the nature of this Ôsignificant shiftÕ in terms of its 
institutional, ideational and normative dimensions. At a structural or institutional level there is no 
doubt that the architecture of the modern state has been transformed and this has been captured 
in a burgeoning literature on the ÔunbundlingÕ (????) or ÔunravellingÕ (?????) of the state. The 
centrifugal (???) delegation of powers, responsibilities and functions away from governmental 
structures combined with the fragmentary impact of market logic have created two core 
challenges that speak directly to the emphasis on Representative and Responsible government offered 
by Birch. The Ôproblem of many handsÕ (????) identifies the inefficiencies and risks created by the 
creation of numerous links in the chain of delegation through which public polices are 
implemented and regulated. The core insight, simply put, being that the Ômore handsÕ or 
institutions that play a role within any delivery chain then the harder it becomes to identify 
exactly who is responsible for what. Fuzzy governance, to put the same point slightly differently, 
leads to fuzzy accountability. And yet to counter this dilemma through the creation of ever 
tighter accountability networks risks producing the Ôproblem of many eyesÕ whereby 
organisational and systemic efficiencies become reduced by the need of actors to constantly 
account for their behaviour to numerous account-demanding bodies rather than concentrating 
on their core tasks. This focus on what Jonathan Koppell terms Ômultiple accountabilities 
disorderÕ takes us straight back to the core focus of BirchÕs Representative and Responsible on how to 
balance the need to offset governing capacity or competence with some degree of representative 
engagement or scrutiny.  
 
And yet to take this forward, Hendriks (2009:693) observes, Ôrepresentative claims are rarely 
explicit in governance networksÕ, and Ômeanings of É representation tend to be celebrated in the 
abstract but are difficult to pin down in the concreteÕ. What this indicates is that the traditional 
link between the electoral mandate and political legitimacy appears to have evolved to the extent 
that claims to non-electoral legitimacy are frequently deployed or claimed by politicians and 
decision-makers on the basis of identity, function, expertise or some notion of non-territorial or 
ÔconstructedÕ communities (as seen in the work of S¿rensen and Torfing 2007; Hendricks 2009; 
Nissen 2014; Chapman and Lowndes 2014). This research also reveals the way in which multiple 
meanings are attached to ÔrepresentationÕ in the practice of governance, not all of which are 
inclusionary in a democratic sense (see Nissen 2014:41; Hendricks 2009:707-8). Placed within the 
context of BirchÕs work it could be argued that the Ôessentially contestedÕ nature of the concepts 
of representation and responsibility Ð a complexity that Birch attempted to unravel - has 
augmented exactly as a result of broader socio-economic and technological shifts in society. To 
suggest that an Ôaccountability gapÕ or Ôdemocratic deficitÕ (see Papadopoulos, 2014) has been 
created by the government-governance transition may well have some validity when viewed 
through the lens of traditional governmental or democratic assumptions. But does this remain 
actually remain valid? Hendricks (2009:710) suggests that it may be Ôunrealistic to expect that 
governance networks replicate the kind of representation and accountability we associate with 
electoral democracyÕ. The challenge for Birch when viewed through a modern lens is that, as 
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks have emphasized in relation to distributed public governance 
(or what they call ÔType IIÕ governance), is that a large amount of public governance now rests 
upon a quite different set of almost post-democratic market-based assumptions.  
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The link, however, from Hooghe and Marks back into BirchÕs analysis is provided by his 
dissection of the ÔambiguousÕ concept of responsibility and, more specifically, his focus on the 
idea that Ôto be responsibleÕ could be correlated with Ôwise policy, whether or not what they do 
meets with immediate approval of the publicÕ (1964:18; discussion in Part I above). Paradoxically, 
being ÔresponsibleÕ from this specific interpretation might actually reject populist pressures or 
short-term demands in favour of a more Ôevidence basedÕ long-term strategy that can only be 
achieved within a democracy through a process of depoliticization (discussed above). As such, 
the analysis of network governance, as this sub-section has illustrated, can be directly related to a 
set of core arguments and themes that were first promoted in BirchÕs Representative and Responsible. 
It was a book about network governance that did not use the term network governance and yet, 
to push the analysis to a deeper level, the danger of this review of network governance is that it 
risks over-emphasizing the Ôhollowing outÕ or evisceration of the state and under-emphasizing the 
continuing role and capacity of the state (see Jacobsson et al. 2015). Indeed, it is possible to trace 
the emergence of a Ôcounter-governanceÕ phase of scholarship that emphasizes not only the 
Ôfilling in of the hollowing outÕ through the creation of new tools, methods or strategies but more 
fundamentally acknowledges the manner in which governance takes place Ôin the shadow of 
hierarchyÕ (????). This leads into a discussion of meta-governance and how it connects with 
BirchÕs work.  
 
 
ii. Meta-Governance [600 words] 
 
Just as representativeness and responsibility are expected to co-exist in parallel within BirchÕs 
thesis so the concept of meta-governance has evolved as part of a wider recognition that there 
has been no simple unidirectional shift from government to governance, instead government and 
governance coexist. In this sense both the representative/responsible nexus and the 
government/governance nexus reflect the existence of a situation of mutual dependency (i.e. 
representative processes legitimate and sustain the exercise of power, just as the institutions of 
government shape, direct and sustain the architecture of governance). It is for this reason that 
Fawcett and Daugbjerg (2012:202) state that effective meta-governance is Ôabout generating 
governance arrangements that deliver adequate levels of input and output legitimacyÕ. The 
notions of ÔeffectiveÕ and ÔadequateÕ levels of legitimacy take us back to BirchÕs initial emphasis 
on the multi-dimensional nature of representation and responsibility within a political context but 
the key insight here is that whether viewed as Ôthe government of governanceÕ (????) or Ôthe 
governance of governanceÕ (????) meta-governance Ôheralds the return of the state by reinventing 
the governing roleÕ (Bevir 2014:31). Meta-governance therefore focuses on the manner in which 
elected politicians and governmental structures still wield significant resources in terms of setting 
the ground rules and parameters within which network governance emerges and operates. The 
ultimate display of this residual capacity is revealed when governments respond to specific crises 
or failures by pulling functions, powers and responsibilities back into governmental structures 
(for a case study see ????).  
 
The concept of the Ôshadow of hierarchyÕ has been invoked in governance studies to 
acknowledge the capacity of the state (in its electoral representative, governmental institutional 
form) to effect, explicitly or implicitly, a legislative or regulatory framework for network activity. 
This ÔshadowÕ hangs over network participants to the extent that structures exist that are 
consciously designed to emphasise the common good above forms of self-interest. As such, Ôa 
functioning shadow of hierarchy not only serves to increase the effectiveness of governance 
involving non-state actorsÕ Borzel and Risse (2010, 116) but also provides a Ôhorizon of 
legitimacyÕ. It was exactly this chain of delegation running from the public through to elected 
politicians and through them to the outer tentacles of the state (and back again) that BirchÕs 
Representative and Responsible sought to expose and explore in both empirical and theoretical ways. 
Legitimacy formed the buckle, lynchpin or nexus between representative and responsible 
government and this basic assumptions remains crucial in contemporary analyses of democratic 
governance. What has changed in the intervening fifty years is not so much the centrality of 
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BirchÕs focus but the size, shape and fragmentation of the modern state in terms of both breadth 
and depth (examined in the literature on network governance) and this has led to a growing 
recognition, frequently drawing on BirchÕs Representative and Responsible, of the importance of 
legitimation afforded by electoral representative processes in the practice of network governance 
(for a longer-term perspective see Judge 1990, 1993, 2005, 2014). Indeed, there are now calls for 
a Ônew democratic governance modelÕ in which Ôtraditional forms of representative government 
are [more explicitly] linked to collaborative arenas of governance and innovation through the 
meta-governance exercised by elected politicians and public managersÕ (Torfing 2014:64). What 
this Ônew democratic governance modelÕ might look like and how it would deal with the 
representative/responsible nexus that Birch focused upon is discussed in Part IV (below) but to 
some extent this discussion can only begin by recognising the interconnected and embedded 
nature of contemporary governance. It is for this reason that the next section focuses on global 
governance. 
 
 
[1,000 words] 
 
Notions of multi-level governance have been deemed to Ôrepresent a transnational version of the 
familiar network ideas employed to understand the domestic level of governanceÕ (Peters and 
Pierre 2004:81). In this version, sub-national, national, transnational and global governance 
networks are intermeshed in interactive matrices, increasingly propelled by instantaneous digital 
communication, which challenge traditional models of state-delimited representative democracy. 
Certainly, a complex pattern of transnational institutional interconnectedness is evident in the 
activities of international policy-making forums such as the United Nations, World Trade 
Organisation, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Group of Eight (G8) or Group of 
Twenty (G20), and international regulatory agencies; the informal deliberative forum of 
international elites of the World Economic Forum; and the emergence of international legal 
institutions associated with Ôcosmopolitan lawÕ (on human rights, the environment, and the 
conduct of war). Moreover, the emergence of a global or transnational civil society has been 
discerned in the rapid spread of international non-governmental organisations (sometimes 
referred to as social movement organisations), and international social movements). These 
interrelated developments, of exponential increases in socio-economic transactions across state 
borders and associated transnational governance responses, leads to Ôan increasing incongruence 
between social and political spacesÕ (Lavenex 2013:107).  
 
Out of this spatial incongruence arises a further political incongruence that as network 
governance at supra-state levels comes to replicate the Ôpost-representativeÕ tendencies at state 
level (i.e. the privileging of non-electoral representation, non-majoritarian institutions and output 
legitimation over electoral representation, majoritarian institutions and input legitimacy) there is 
an amplification of calls for the ÔdemocratisationÕ of global governance. Put in the context of 
BirchÕs Representative and Responsible, the architecture of transnational and global governance has 
predominantly been constructed on the logic of responsible governance (i.e. strong, stable, 
insulated, distant, elite, etc.) rather than representative governance. This presents at least three 
dilemmas. First, calls for the democratisation of global governance are to some extent 
undermined by the rise in anti-politics and democratic disengagement at the national level. And 
yet (and secondly) while governance has become increasingly multi-layered and transnational, 
political representation and democratic legitimation have remained rooted in the practice of 
nation-states. This flows into a discursive and ideational deficiency in the sense of the design and 
promotion of alternative visions or structures for securing democracy, in general, and an 
appropriate balance between representative and responsibility, in particular. Even if such a ÔvisionÕ 
could be agreed (thirdly) the up-scaling or implementation of any new Ômodel of democracyÕ 
would be difficult in the absence of any system of Ômeta-governance of multi-level governanceÕ 
(Torfing et al. 2012:96). Global representative assemblies could, for example, recognise the 
Ôimportance of non-territorially bounded political communities composed of individuals with 
common interestsÕ as Archibugi and Held have suggested (2011:448). They might also reflect the 
growing importance of a global civil society above and beyond national civil societies (see Kuper 
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2004:122-7) and draw-upon non-electoral forms of political legitimacy. But as David Judge 
(2014:180-3) has argued, even if established these institutions of global democracy were 
established they would in all likelihood be treated as ÔinferiorÕ or ÔsecondaryÕ to electorally 
mandated legitimacy of state-based institutions.   
 
There is, however, a more basic element at play here that once again re-focuses our attention on 
BirchÕs Representative and Responsible and that is the politics of democratisation within global governance. 
As Alastair RobertsÕ The Logic of Discipline (2010) illustrates, the architecture of global governance 
has become infused with what he terms Ôthe logic of disciplineÕ. This ÔlogicÕ promotes a very 
technocratic and narrow view of politics and wherever possible the depoliticisation of democracy 
in order to maximise economic efficiency and the role of markets. This Ôhands offÕ approach to 
public policy helps explain (returning to notions of network governance) not just the mergence 
of fuzzy governance but also fuzzy accountability and when viewed through the lens of BirchÕs 
framework the Ôlogic of disciplineÕ is synonymous with an almost complete focus on 
ÔresponsibilityÕ rather than representation. This leads into some of the broader Ôend of politicsÕ 
narratives that are associated with the work of Carl Boggs (and others) and will be discussed 
below but one final empirical example of the contemporary relevance of BirchÕs scholarship that 
flows out of this sectionÕs focus on trans-national and global governance has to be some 
comment on the European Union. In essence the EU provides a perfect case that sits at the 
intersection of national and global debates and has its roots in the simple fact that it was born 
our of a desire to prevent war rather than to promote democracy. The European Coal and Steel 
Community (established in 1951) was inspired by a variant of the Ôlogic of disciplineÕ model 
whereby the national discretion of nation states to wage war would be severely restricted by 
international agreements. Responsible governance in the sense of peaceful and stable co-
existence between nation states was placed above representative governance and it was Ð to 
paraphrase Roberts Ð a rule-based approach to limiting politiciansÕ ability to embark on reckless 
military schemes. The gradual evolution in the breadth of policy areas and the institutional fabric 
of the EU since the middle of the twentieth century largely retained this technocratic emphasis 
with debates concerning the need to shift the balance between representativeness and 
responsibility only emerging relatively recently, and notably in the wake of the global financial 
crisis. BirchÕs nexus between representation and responsible government therefore goes to the 
heart of the current debate about the future of the UK and is for this reason ubiquitous in the 
field of European studies. Myrto TsakatikaÕs Political Responsibility in the European Union, for 
example, draws upon BirchÕs work to suggest that ÔIt would seemÉthat MonnetÕs conception of 
legitimate governance, on the one hand, strongly requires the qualities of political responsibility, 
but on the other hand, is incomplete with what are generally understood to be the institutional 
features of responsibilityÕ (2008, 30-31). The emphasis on Ôgenerally understoodÕ raises a host of 
questions concerning the legitimation of power and has in the European context been challenged 
by scholars such as Andrew Moravcsik as part of a reassessment of legitimacy and how it is 
conceived in the EU. Such a reassessment would dovetail with the ideas and arguments of Birch, 
notably in relation to his identification of democratic incongruities. It is away from a focus on 
governance and towards a focus on democracy that we now turn.  
 
 
 
 
 
IV. DEMOCRACY, REPRESENTATION & RESPONSIBILITY 
 
The relationship between representation and responsibility is also an intrinsic part of KeaneÕs 
Ôfundamental revision of the way we think about representation and democracy in our timesÕ 
(2011:212). This revision starts from the premise that there has been Ôan historic sea changeÕ; and 
that Ôfrom roughly the mid-twentieth century representative democracy began to morph into a 
new historical form of Òpost-parliamentary democracyÓÕ (2011:212). This new form was 
Ômonitory democracyÕ. A form in which the rapid, almost exponential growth of extra-
parliamentary, power-scrutinising mechanisms Ð combined with the growth of Ômulti-media 
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saturated societiesÕ, symbolised by the communicative plenitude and possibilities of the internet Ð 
produced a latticed, networked pattern of power monitoring. The distinctiveness of monitory 
democracy for Keane (2009:695 original emphasis) was thus to be found in: Ôthe way all fields of 
social and political life come to be scrutinised, not just by the standard machinery of representative 
democracy but a whole host of non-party, extra-parliamentary and often unelected bodies, operating 
within and underneath and beyond the boundaries of territorial statesÕ. Such was the degree of 
difference and complexity of this new democracy that it Ôdemands a headshift, a break with 
conventional thinkingÕ to encompass the growth of new types of extra-parliamentary, power-
scrutinising institutions Ôunknown to previous democratsÕ (2011:213). Indeed, Keane identifies 
over 100 such institutions that have developed since 1945. Although diverse and disjointed these 
new monitory institutions are defined Ôby their overall commitment to strengthening the diversity 
and influence of citizensÕ voices and choices in decisions that affect their lives Ð regardless of the 
outcome of electionsÕ (Keane 2009:693; 2011:216 emphasis added). In particular, they are concerned 
to scrutinise and control the activities of decision-makers (in both public and private 
organisations, and electoral and non-electoral institutions). Nonetheless, while Keane is adamant 
that monitory democracy Ôoperates in ways greatly at variance with textbook accounts of 
ÒrepresentativeÓ, ÒliberalÓ or Òparliamentary democracyÓÕ (Keane 2009:706; 2011:221), he insists, 
repeatedly, that Ôconventional party-centred forms of representation do not wither awayÕ 
(2011:220); Ôinstitutions like periodic elections, multi-party competition and the right of citizens 
to voice their public approval or disapproval of legislation remain familiar fixtures in the life of 
democraciesÕ (Keane 2009:706); and, that Ômonitory democracy in fact thrives on representationÕ 
(2011:220). 
 
For Keane, therefore, the increase in political accountability in the profusion of power-
scrutinising mechanisms does not stand in an antagonistic relationship to the governing capacity 
of elected representatives Yet, his critics fear that in practice Ôpower is being siphoned away from 
the traditional institutions of representative democracy (that were at least mandated and 
legitimized through electoral mechanisms) and transferred to a new activist eliteÕ (Flinders 
2011:609). In this critical view, monitory democracy is thus Ôsomething to fear rather than 
celebrateÕ (Flinders 2011:608 original emphasis). The specific fear is that the politicisation of 
accountability through the activities of monitory institutions serves to eviscerate public trust and 
confidence in elected politicians and electoral representative processes.   
 
The end of representative politics? 
 
The question mark in the heading above has been added to the title of Simon TormeyÕs book The 
end of representative politics (2015). The significance of this punctuational addition is that for Tormey 
it appears, initially at least, not to be needed: the end of representative politics isnÕt in question, it 
isnÕt nigh, it is already here. A closer reading of TormeyÕs book reveals, however, that he is not so 
much concerned with ÔendismÕ as with demonstrating that the Ôparadigm of representative 
politicsÕ, and the Ôaura of representationÕ, is waning (Tormey 2015:8). In other words he rapidly 
adds a metaphorical question mark to his bold title. Indeed, in situating his analysis in the realm 
of Ôpost-representationÕ, rather than the broader frames of Ômonitory democracyÕ or Ôpost-
democracyÕ, this enables him to claim that the prefix ÔpostÕ serves as Ôa useful marker, that is, as 
indicating not the redundancy of the object in question, so much as its querying. É less a passing 
of representation, and more an incipient problematization that evinces dissatisfaction but without 
presupposing the acceptance of a clear break or alternativeÕ (2015:9). 
 
In order to reach this conclusion Tormey starts from two basic propositions. First, that 
representative politics is a ÔverticalÕ mode of politics Ð Ô[s]omeone at the ÒtopÒ represents those 
belowÕ Ð whereas Ôthe new emergent styles of politics are often ÒhorizontalÓ, which is to say that 
they are often leaderless, Òbottom upÓ movements or initiativesÕ (2015:9). Second, representative 
politics and representative democracy should be treated as Ôdiscrete objects of historical inquiryÕ 
(2015:11). In the event, this distinction is superseded by another dualism: between Ôpolitical 
representationÕ and Ôrepresentative politicsÕ. On the one hand, Ôpolitical representationÕ is 
associated with ÔmodernityÕ and the rise of the nation state (2015:39-46), where representation 
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implied a process of re-presenting the collective will, and where the introduction of elections 
Ôimplied above all else that those doing the representing were now accountable in some direct 
fashion to the populaceÕ (2015:46). On the other hand, Ôrepresentative politicsÕ is the preserve of 
political parties and associated with a changed dynamic, brought about in the 18th and 19th 
centuries through competitive elections and the widening of voting rights (2015:48). And party-
based competition is still the dominant form that representative politics takes in most 
contemporary democracies (2015:54).  
 
Ultimately, and ÔinevitablyÕ in TormeyÕs view, both ÔrepresentationÕ and Ôrepresentative politicsÕ 
result in a political division of labour where Ôsome will rule or govern, and others will followÕ 
(2015:57). A disjuncture is thus identified at the heart of representative politics where the 
represented Ôcannot govern, manage, lead itselfÕ and so Ômust be governed, managed, ledÕ by 
representatives (2015:58). But having identified an ÔinevitableÕ link between representative politics 
as governing and ruling, Tormey almost immediately back-peddles in his acknowledgement that 
Ôgoverning, and even less ruling, is not the same as representingÕ (2015:79). But no positive 
exposition of what constitutes representation, or how it is constituted subsequently flows from 
this negative acknowledgment. In specifying a disjuncture, an antagonism, between represented 
and representatives Tormey effectively excludes from his analysis most of the contemporary 
reconceptualistions of representation Ð of descriptive representation, claims-based representation, 
and most forms of non-electoral representation Ð all of which operate within the ÔparadigmÕ of 
representation, and all of which inhere connection (rather than disjuncture) and authorisation 
(rather than ÔresistanceÕ (2015:60)) at the centre of representation. 
 
Moreover, in associating representative politics with Ôstructures and practices built on a ÒverticalÓ 
basisÕ (2015:77) the notion of hierarchy (Ôrepresentatives over representedÕ (2015:77 emphasis 
added)) is embedded in, what Tormey calls, the metanarrative of representation. And it is this 
metanarrative that has come to be questioned in recent decades. According to Tormey (2015:83 
original emphasis), we no longer believe that Ôour interests are best served if some represent and 
everyone else is represented. We are becoming unrepresentableÕ. In which case, Tormey sets himself 
the task of envisaging a Ôdemocracy of the unrepresentableÕ (2015:104) by extrapolating trends 
already apparent in representative democracies. Such a system would privilege Ôhorizontal 
organizationsÕ, such as alliances, coalitions, networks, affinity groups, and Ônon-organisingÕ or 
Ôauto-organisingÕ groups (2015:94), and be energised both by the individualisation of politics and 
the mobilising potential of social media. The problem, however, with notions of a politics of the 
unrepresentable and of anti-representative representation is that they are defined in contradistinction to a 
politics of hierarchy and linearity (2015:131-2), which for Tormey characterises representative 
politics. Yet, as noted earlier in this article, one of the major advances in the reconceptualisation 
of representation is the recognition of an economy of non-linear, non-hierarchical, non-electoral, 
and often non-state based, representative claims. Although Tormey (2015:57,129) is aware of the 
possibility of representative claims being articulated within and outside of the formal system of 
representation, his stipulated meaning of representative politics effectively ignores such claims-
making. The significance of this for the present discussion is, as Keane (2015) points out: 
 
[The] trouble is that the new Ôimmediate or non-mediated politicsÕ forms of democratic 
politics [Tormey] has in mind are everywhere, and without exception, instances of 
representative politics. Their lack of structure and formal leadership and avowed rejection of 
representation É are only apparent. Their reliance upon mechanisms of representation is too 
often disguised, or denied. Truth is they rely upon mechanisms of representation, if by that 
word is meant what the earliest champions of representative democracy meant: acting on 
behalf of others, in their name, subject to their consent. 
 
So where are we now? More representation, more responsibility, but less ÔandÕ? 
 
In making the pronouncement that Ôa representative system enables a government to be 
responsibleÕ Birch (1964:21) maintained that public demands could be expressed, modified and 
conveyed to government (including the Ôopinions of inarticulate and unorganised citizensÕ), while 
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at the same time this system provided Ôa way of bridging the gulf between the policies a 
government would follow if it responded to the varying day-to-day expressions of public opinion 
and those it must follow if its policies are to be coherent and mutually consistentÕ. In this sense 
ÔrepresentationÕ was conceptually linked, in a mutually beneficial systemic relationship, with 
ÔresponsibilityÕ by the grammatical conjunction ÔandÕ. Birch also maintained that this was a 
conjunction rooted in electoral processes and governing legitimacy derived from those processes. 
Yet, Birch was clear that it was possible to conceive of representation beyond elections, and to 
examine responsibility beyond formal representative institutions. He was equally clear that 
political practice might diverge in many significant ways from the mutually beneficial conjunction 
derived from idealised theories of representative and responsible government (Birch 1964:65, 80). 
 
More representation 
 
So our fundamental task is now to decide whether the conceptual and practical conjunction of 
representation with responsibility still holds in the 21st century. The preceding discussion has 
revealed that there is now ÔmoreÕ representation. Conceptually there has been an expansion 
beyond elections and beyond principal-agent notions. The idea that representation is constitutive, 
and that representation is a process of claim-making, leads to recognition of the sheer scope and 
variability of the concept. In the words of Saward (2014: 725), one of the most influential 
contemporary ÔreconceptualisersÕ of representation, Ôit is a protean phenomenon that can be 
formal and informal, electoral and nonelectoral, national and transnational, potentially happening 
in multiple spaces and possessing many guisesÕ. Political representation thus comes to be 
conceived as an Ôeconomy of claim-makingÕ encompassing organised interest groups, advocacy 
organisations, social movements, identity groups, expert individuals and associations, surrogates 
or self-authorised representatives, demonstrators, protest groups, and stakeholders. This 
ÔeconomyÕ operates both within and beyond the state. ÔBeyondÕ in both a territorial sense (at 
regional, international and global levels) and an institutional sense (within civil society and 
governance networks). Indeed, according to Urbinati and Warren (2008:404), there is Ôno discrete 
domain of institutional processesÕ encompassing self-authorised representation as it stands as Ôa 
representative phenomenon in its own rightÕ. 
 
While notions of claim-making have certainly widened the focus of the theorisation of 
representation, reservations have been expressed about the empirical utility of a claim-making 
perspective (see for example de Wilde 2013; Lord and Pollak 2013; Hendriks 2009). Nonetheless, 
conceptualisations of claim-making and non-electoral representation have been invaluable in 
reminding analysts of the systemic, constitutive and process elements of representation beyond 
elections. An essential part of this remembrance has been an acknowledgment that partial or 
partisan aggregations are Ôneither optional nor accidentalÕ (Urbinati 2006:227) to conceptions of 
political representation. Moreover the empirical significance of such ÔaggregationsÕ has been 
mapped in their proliferation and their steady infusion into the practice representative politics. 
There are simply more of them: more partial claims makers, more parties, more groups. If the 
essence of non-electoral representation is, as Saward argues, a claim to represent the interests of a 
specified group, then such partial claims have become more embedded in contemporary 
representative economies of claims. Thus, beyond electoral representation there is now, to 
misquote Urbinati (2006:225), a ÔsurplusÕ of representative politics. We will return to what 
Urbinati actually meant below, but here we will simply note that the conceptual scope and 
empirical range of representation has expanded significantly in the decades since Birch was 
writing. 
 
Moreover, in this intervening period, electoral representation itself has also witnessed an 
ÔexpansionÕ: quantitatively in terms of the number of elections, and qualitatively in terms of the 
normative claims made for the representative inclusion of previously unrepresented or 
underrepresented groups Ð most notably women and ethnic minorities Ð from state decision 
making, and in terms of the changing profiles of party competition. Taking this last point first. 
Traditionally party competition has been conceived in terms not only of articulating claims but 
also of aggregating claims (rooted in identifiable social, political or ideological collectivities); and 
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this conception has come under challenge from simultaneous processes of individualisation, 
mediatisation and globalisation (van Biezen 2014:187). Nonetheless, party competition has not 
diminished ineluctably but rather has expanded. ÔNewÕ parties have emerged to contest elections 
on non-aggregative platforms with non-governmental aspirations and often with Ôanti-Õ 
orientations. These take the forms, variously, of pop-up parties, micro-parties, populist parties, 
anti-representative parties, anti-system parties, and are loosely categorised as Ôprotest partiesÕ 
(Tormey 2015:139). The new parties may pose problems for governing parties and for 
representative government, but they still serve to inject more representative claims into the 
representative system.  
 
There has also been a quantitative expansion of the Ôelectoral marketplaceÕ in many representative 
systems. This has particularly been the case in EU states where simultaneous institutional 
regionalisation and Europeanisation have generated more voting opportunities for more 
representative institutions at more levels of governance (Dalton and Gray 2003:27-35). Similarly, 
the numbers of Ôelectoral consumersÕ have increased with incremental reductions in the age of 
voting in many states since 1964. Alongside this quantitative expansion there have also been 
moves towards qualitative enhancement of the representative process through recognition of the 
descriptive claims of previously underrepresented social and identity groups, and practical 
programmes to increase their presence in public representative institutions (see Hughes et al. 
2015; Krook and Zetterberg 2014; Krook and Norris 2014 xx; Bird 2014; xx). 
 
More responsibility 
 
Correspondingly, there is ÔmoreÕ political responsibility; or, more accurately, there is more public 
accountability in BirchÕs third sense of the word. Accountability mechanisms, noted earlier Ð 
audit institutions and auditing (value for money, performance auditing, efficiency auditing), 
performance reporting, independent regulators, transparency mechanisms, watchdog journalism 
Ð have proliferated. In particular, KeaneÕs notion of Ômonitory democracyÕ celebrates the way in 
which Ôpower-monitoringÕ and Ôpower-controllingÕ devices have extended throughout the modern 
state and civil society. ÔThese watchdog and guide-dog and barking-dog inventions are changing 
É the political dynamics of many democracies, which no longer bear much resemblance to 
textbook models of representative democracyÕ (Keane 2009:xxvii). For Keane this is essentially 
change in a positive direction, the scrutiny of power by a multitude of monitory bodies makes it 
Ôthe most energetic, most dynamic form of democracy everÕ (2009:743). Monitory democracy is 
Ôsomething other and differentÕ with profound implications for Ôstate-framed institutions of the 
old representative democracyÕ (2011:233). Yet, in KeaneÕs conception of monitory democracy 
electoral institutions, as noted above, do not disappear; the monitoring mechanisms inscribed in 
civil society are seen as supplements to electoral representation, even if their intent is to Ôgreatly 
complicate, and sometimes wrong foot, the lives of politicians, parties, legislatures and 
governmentÕs (2009:xxvii). In essence, in this view, there is no such thing as too much 
accountability.   
 
 
V. NEITHER REPRESENTATIVE NOR RESPONSIBLE 
 
The paradox of ÔmoreÕ representation and ÔmoreÕ responsibility, as calibrated above, is that when 
conjoined they appear to have resulted in a diminution (a ÔlesseningÕ) of Ôrepresentative and 
responsible governmentÕ as presented by Birch. It has become something of a truism amongst 
political scientists that representative politics Ôis failing to engageÕ. Evidence of citizen distrust, 
disconnect, disengagement, and disappointment with the institutions of representative 
government continues to fuel discussions of the Ôcrisis of representative politicsÕ. Even when 
citizens are deemed to be ÔengagedÕ Ð through other modes of representation beyond elections in 
a broader economy of claims Ð the prognosis for electoral representation may still appear to be 
pathological.  
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If non-electoral representation (and, more broadly, direct Ôdemocratic innovationsÕ) constitute a 
response to the perceived deficiencies of an aggregative representative system and a search for a 
more legitimate political order, then rooting that order in an existing electoral representative 
frame holds the potential to generate fundamental conceptual and practical incongruities. Not the 
least of these incongruities is the need to reconcile the unregulated economy of non-electoral 
representative claims (and unmediated modes of participation) with the regulation and mediation 
of electoral representative processes and institutions. Equally, the perceived legitimacy of 
democratic innovative institutions Ð rooted primarily in non-electoral legitimation claims Ð stand 
in a dialectical and incongruous relationship with the legitimation claims stemming from electoral 
representative institutions. A Ôsurplus of politicsÕ generated by non-electoral representative claims 
is thus different to a Ôsurplus of politicsÕ in UrbinatiÕs (2006:225) original meaning. For her such a 
surplus is related to the electoral sanctioning by citizens of the Ôdeeds and promises of candidate 
and representativesÕ. More particularly: 
 
Representation makes politics into a continuum by binding short yes/no politics [of 
elections] to longer-term interelectoral cycles. Moreover, it provides for a further connection: 
that between the informal deliberation citizens activate within civil society through their 
direct political and multifarious forms of presence and the formal deliberation of 
representatives within state institutions. (Urbinati 2006:225-6)  
 
Whereas UrbinatiÕs conception of electorally-based representation is one that produces a Ôsurplus 
of politicsÕ and emphasises processes of ÔunitingÕ and ÔconnectionÕ, most other perspectives 
examined above (non-electoral, descriptive, claims-making, governance, monitory democracy and 
post-representation) identify an alternative conception of ÔsurplusÕ Ð in representative and 
accountability processes that emphasise fragmentation, dislocation, individualisation, and 
difference. Most of them, in their various ways, identify some form of relationship between 
representation and responsibility/accountability (see Urbinati and Warren 2009:404-5; 
Montanaro 2012:1101-4; Saward, 2010:165; Jones 2014:194-7; Tormey 2015:127,141-2). But the 
relationship is often tenuous and tangential; both in its conceptual specification and in its 
practical realisation; ÔmoreÕ representation or ÔmoreÕ responsibility become panaceas in 
themselves: it appears sufficient merely to claim that one will supplement the other.  
 
Yet if, as noted earlier, Ôrepresentation is accountabilityÕ then political representation assumes a 
dynamic process of combined authorisation and responsibility in decision-making. As Alonso et 
al. (2011:7) argue: ÔRepresentation Ð ideally conceived Ð is an act of delegation whereby the 
represented grant representatives the task of defending their interests, all the while insisting that 
they remain directly accountable to the representatives for their actionsÕ. In a system of 
Ôrepresentative and responsible governmentÕ, as described by Birch, elections provide recurring 
opportunities where the represented assent to being represented Ð whether assent is based upon 
prospective or retrospective judgements of representativesÕ performance, or both. In other words, 
electoral representation does double duty of linking responsiveness to responsibility and 
accountability to representation. Yet, in seeking to question traditional views of electoral 
representation and political responsibility Ð by Ôenhancing the complex ecologyÕ of what 
constitutes representation and accountability, by seeking to Ôadd toÕ, Ôto extendÕ, to make 
democracy more representative or more accountable  Ð reconceptualistions and reconfigurations 
of representation and responsibility (in isolation from each other) run the risk of missing their 
inextricable connection in a democratic system of government.  
 
DubnikÕs (2011:712) observation on accountability provides a metaphorical point of punctuation 
on which to end this article. He argued that Ôany effort to enhance accountability also alters 
accountabilityÕ. This can be extended further to Ôany effort to enhance representation also alters 
representationÕ. In both cases enhancement involves disruptions and alterations of existing 
relationships. In this article we have examined how the ÔenhancementÕ of representation and 
accountability has been conceived and activated. And this provides an endpoint, a metaphorical 
full stop to our discussion. But equally what is needed is a metaphorical hyphen: consideration of 
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how these ÔchangedÕ, ÔenhancedÕ relationships impact on each other, on how conceptual 
rethinking in each area needs to be matched by a reconceptualisation of how representation and 
responsibility connect, or may reconnect, with each other, and in what respects Ôa representative 
system [still] enables a government to be responsibleÕ. The importance of the conjunction ÔandÕ 
needs both to be remembered and to be investigated seriously in analysing the Ônew orthodoxiesÕ 
of non-electoral, governance, monitory, and post-representative systems. Recognising the 
importance of this conjunction is the lasting legacy bequeathed by Birch. 
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